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1

INTRODUCTION

In a remarkable passage in John Henry Wigmore’s well-known treatise on evidence law (1905),
he notes, “[f]or three hundred years it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that
the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence” (p. 2965). This sentence is often quoted (e.g.,
Allen and Mace, 2004; Amar and Lettow, 1995), but what is less appreciated is that Wigmore’s
defense of this “right” was primarily about its “correlative,” that is, “the unquestioned duty” of
“the individual to society” (p. 2968) to “give what testimony one is capable of giving” (p. 2965).
Wigmore says that this is a “sacrifice . . . due from every member of the community,” bearing
which is “a duty, not to be grudged or evaded” (p. 2967). In fact, as he sees it, civilization as we
know it depends on it, as he says that “whether the achievements of the past shall be preserved,
the energy of the present kept alive, and the ambition of the future be realized, depends upon
whether the daily business of regulating rights and redressing wrongs shall continue without a
moment’s abatement . . . ” (p. 2968). He sternly warns that “[w]hoever is impelled to evade or to
resent it should retire from the society of organized and civilized communities, and become a
hermit” (p. 2967).
Compare Wigmore’s exhortation with the following, contemporary and very different, example, which takes it outside the context of giving testimony in a courtroom. Saturday Night Live has
a recurring segment called “Black Jeopardy!,” which uses the format of the quiz show “Jeopardy!”
to illustrate, in a comically exaggerated way, the different worlds that people of different races –
blacks and whites, mostly – inhabit in the United States. One of the most well-known episodes is
the one featuring Chadwick Boseman as King T’Challa of the fictional state of Wakanda in Black
Panther (Coogler, Cole, & Lee, 2018). When the question posed is what one does when “[t]he
policeman says there’s been some robberies in your neighborhood and asks if you have any information,” King T’Challa answers: “[N]ot only do I tell this man what I know, but I also assist him
in tracking down the offender. After all, our ministers of law enforcement are only here to protect
us. Is this correct?” The quiz show host, played as usual with knowing affability by Kenan Thompson, responds with a chuckle, implying “no” to the question. He then adds: “I mean, it should be.
But I’m thinking you haven’t spent much time in America” (Tucker, Che, & King, 2018).
Finally, consider the plot of the movie Unfaithful, a movie about an extramarital affair, where
a husband whose wife has an affair kills her lover, destroys all evidence of the crime, hides the
dead body, and lies to the police when they, following a lead, come to their house to investigate
(Lyne, Chabrol, Sargent, & Broyles, 2002). But later, at the end of the movie, the couple drive to a
210

© 2021 Wiley Periodicals LLC

wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/phis

Philosophical Issues. 2021;31:210–226.

LEE

211

police station, though the audience never finds out if the husband goes in or flees. Should he or
should he not go in? According to Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court, the
answer is clear. Dissenting in Minnick v. Mississippi (1990), a case reinforcing certain constitutional
restrictions on police interrogations, he has written that “[w]hile every person is entitled to stand
silent, it is more virtuous for the wrongdoer to admit his offence and accept the punishment he
deserves” and that “to design our laws on premises contrary” to that view is “to abandon belief
in either personal responsibility or the moral claim of just government to obedience” (p. 167).
Furthermore, he added that investigators should be allowed “to urge, or even ask, a person in
custody to do what is right” (p. 167). Despite Justice Scalia’s invocation of the language of virtue,
he is not talking about mere private morality, as he is talking about what a government is to expect
from its citizens.
One might say that Justice Scalia’s attitude towards law enforcement is out of touch and that
Saturday Night Live’s irreverent attitude is more au courant, but notice that even the cynicism
of the T’Challa sketch is delivered with the suggestion that in a better world – say a just society –
cooperating with law enforcement is the right thing to do (though how much cooperation is called
for is not spelled out). Of course, there is no question that the fact that T’Challa’s suggestion is met
with such immediate dismissive ridicule is indicative of a deep animosity between the police and
the Black community. But when the quiz show host says that T’Challa’s answer would be correct
in a better world, it is to be understood not just as a stinging and cathartic social criticism, but as
an idea that goes back all the way to Wigmore one hundred years ago, and, according to Wigmore,
three hundred more years before him. Assuming a just society, Wigmore’s argument that we all
have a duty to help uphold “justice as an institution[] and from law and order as indispensable
elements of civilized life” seems to generate the conclusion that “the community as a whole”
can rightly demand that citizens assist in increasing the legal system’s knowledge of criminal
wrongdoing. And, as Justice Scalia’s comments suggest, the moral force of this idea can be felt
even with regard to the question whether to inform the authorities about one’s own wrongdoing.
Such ideas are in fact reflected in the law today in many places, most starkly in laws that criminalize various failures to cooperate with the legal system, even in situations where cooperation
would lead to prosecution of oneself. In other words, we have indeed, as Justice Scalia urged,
“design[ed] our laws” on the premise of “the moral claim of just government to obedience.” The
purpose of this Essay is to closely examine these criminal laws and consider the proposition that
citizens have an obligation to cooperate with law enforcement, including by undertaking measures that enhance the society’s knowledge of one’s own and others’ criminal activities. This Essay
will defend the following propositions.
First, once we start from the assumption that there is a duty on the part of citizens to cooperate
with the legal system (again assuming a just legal system), it is difficult to resist the conclusion that
citizens have a duty to cooperate with law enforcement and provide information about criminal
wrongdoing to the authorities, and the duty appears to extend not just to other people’s criminal
wrongdoing but to one’s own.1 Furthermore, the initial stance one adopts towards the desirability
of cooperating with law enforcement makes it difficult to object to various measures the state
adopts towards compelling such cooperation, including criminal enforcement.
Second, a society in which citizens understand themselves to have a moral obligation to cooperate with law enforcement is not necessarily a good society, pace Wigmore, King T’Challa, and
Justice Scalia. The point certainly is not that people should not comply with the law as a general
matter or attempt to evade legal requirements. Neither is the point to advocate for the familiar
position that one is permitted, or even required, to protest and resist unjust laws and unjust applications of the law (e.g., Delmas, 2018). Rather, this Essay will argue that, in a good society, there
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is a proper, even adversarial, distance between citizens and the state that requires a constant vigilance to maintain. A society that fails to enforce that space between citizens and the state would
not be a good society.
It should be clear by now to most careful readers that this Essay is about the duty to cooperate
with law enforcement in a just society. There is certainly much to say about one’s proper attitude
to law enforcement in an unjust society, and much has indeed been said about that topic (e.g.,
Shelby, 2016; Yankah, 2019; Gardner, 2020; Capers, 2018). This Essay, instead of rehashing those
arguments, explores the issue of the proper relationship between citizens and the state in a just
society, and argues in favor of providing space for resistance, even in a just society.

2

DUTY TO COOPERATE AND THE HOLMESIAN BAD MAN

Is there a duty to cooperate with law enforcement? We might start by distinguishing between
obligatory and supererogatory acts. Cooperating with the law enforcement or the state generally
may be mandatory or supererogatory, and the distinction is important and is tempting as a quick
solution. At the same time, while it may seem unproblematic for the state to take the view that
cooperating with the state is encouraged (supererogatory) but not required (obligatory), a belief
that something is supererogatory may end up serving as the basis for requiring it, a phenomenon
we might call “obligation-creep.” Therefore, instead of deploying the distinction to bring immediate relief and feel like we have arrived at a happy place and leaving it at that, it is important to
first closely scrutinize the question whether there is a duty to cooperate with law enforcement.
So, if there is a duty to cooperate with law enforcement officers, where would it come from?
Unlike, say, a duty to save a drowning baby when doing so can be done easily, which we may
characterize as a natural or pre-legal duty, a duty to cooperate with law enforcement makes sense
only with background assumptions about the existence of legal institutions. A duty to cooperate
with law enforcement officers is not the same as a duty to obey the law, but the ideas are closely
related. Therefore, it is instructive to revisit the debate over the duty to obey the law when thinking
about the purported duty to cooperate with law enforcement.
Whether citizens have an obligation to obey the law is a topic with a long tradition in political
philosophy. This tradition has given rise to examples of situations where disobedience is either
permissible or even required. Some examples involve situations of pointless obedience – like a stop
sign in the middle of a wide open desert on a sunny day with no other cars around – and some
examples involve unjust laws like racist and antisemitic laws that target and persecute certain
segments of the population. Such examples, though, raise the following question: how should we
think about all other situations where the law in question is neither pointless nor unjust? What
if one believes that one could give a good reason to have a law in existence? What should one’s
attitude towards it be then?
For legal scholars, a familiar starting point in such an inquiry is Oliver Wendell Holmes and
his construct of the “bad man” (1857):
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to
predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law
or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience (p. 459).
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Holmes further warns that because “[t]he law is full of phraseology drawn from morals,” we
may “pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it,” but to do so is to “drop into fallacy”
as law and morality are not the same (pp. 459–460).
Under this Holmesian construct, one’s attitude towards a law that is neither pointless nor unjust
would radically differ depending on whether one acts like a bad person or a good person. A good
person would do the ethical thing dictated by his or her conscience, and when the law is neither
pointless nor unjust, following the law just because that is the right thing to do would be a genuine
option for a good person. There may of course be times when their conscience would direct them
to disobey unjust laws, but in the limited universe where the law is neither pointless nor unjust,
one could easily imagine a good person, who seeks to do the right thing, complying with the law
in order to cooperate, most of the time.
And the bad person? The bad person would not be like that, even assuming a world in which
the law is neither pointless nor unjust. The bad person, who cares only about whether certain
“disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory payment of money” (p. 461)
will follow if they do or fail to do something, would obey the law only when doing so would
advance their personal interests. Whether they obey the law or not would depend on what those
interests are, and the existence of sanctions would make a difference to their behaviors by having
an impact on such interests. Even if a law is a good law that is just and advances the social wellbeing, the bad person would not support it unless supporting it would help them in some way,
such as avoiding sanctions.
When regarding the general question of how one should approach laws that are neither pointless nor unjust, then, one might approach it by asking whether to be a good person or a bad person.
Put like that, the question answers itself. Of course one should be a good person. Holmes’ admonition that we not confuse law with morality has an important limitation, namely the conditional,
“[i]f you want to know the law and nothing else.” That is, those who study the law should see the
law from the perspective of the “bad man.” Holmes is thus not making a general argument as to
how one ought to live in relation to legal obligations. Once we are released of the Holmesian bad
man construct in that way, it seems that we are permitted to be “good” without worrying about
“drop[ping] into fallacy.” The choice then seems clear. As a general matter, being good is good, so
one ought to be a good person, the kind who “finds . . . reasons for conduct, whether inside the
law or outside of it, in the . . . sanctions of conscience.”
But what does being “good” really mean when it comes to law? I suggested above that a “good
person,” when dealing with laws that are neither pointless nor unjust, would comply with the law
in order to cooperate, most of the time. That is, however, too simplistic.
Consider the term “obedience.” If people go around in life never killing or raping, do they
“obey” the laws that prohibit such conduct? In a sense, yes, they do because they do not break
these laws. On the other hand, they do not “obey” or “follow” the law; they merely behave in a
way that does not involve committing an act that is prohibited. For these kinds of offenses, many
people would behave the same way with or without laws that prohibit them, simply because they
are good people who behave morally at all times for whom the thought of doing acts that the law
prohibits is not even a live possibility or are ordinary people who may refrain from certain acts
that occur to them simply because they are wrong.
Therefore, to make a link between being a “good person” and obeying the law, we would need
to say something about a person who does or refrains from doing something because of the law.
The purest instance of obedience would be the act of doing something or refraining from doing
something just because that is what the law requires. Of course, even the Holmesian bad person
acts for reasons that have to do with the law given that a bad person, being prudent, may obey
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the law in order to avoid the bad consequences that follow from disobeying. And among these
two types of obedients, I am merely interested in examining the attitude of doing something or
refraining from doing something because that is what the law requires, not because of unpleasant
consequences that the law imposes on disobedients.
Take the act of paying one’s taxes. A Holmesian bad person would not pay taxes unless the
possibility of audit and sanctions for tax evasion is real enough to be a worry. But what would
a good person do? Taxation is a way of raising public revenue in order to put that revenue to
public use, and the government has devised formulas to determine how much each taxpayer must
contribute to the general fund. A standard position thus is that there is a moral obligation to pay
one’s taxes, and it would be based on a consideration like the following as articulated by John
Rawls (1971):
The main idea is that when a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous
cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have submitted to these restrictions have
a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their
submission. We are not to gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing
our fair share (p. 112).
Whether this principle of fairness embodies a correct moral principle and whether it can ground
political obligations have been vigorously debated. Setting that debate aside for the time being, we
might focus on the quite plausible main intuition that it is wrong to free-ride. People who cut in
line benefit from others’ following the rules without doing their fair share. People who litter after
enjoying a nice picnic at a neighborhood garden kept clean by people cleaning up after themselves
benefit from others’ cooperation without doing their share of cleaning. Along the same lines, we
might say that a good person pays their taxes even when the possibility of detection of tax evasion
is low.
Another way to ground one’s duty to pay taxes may be articulated as follows, again from Rawls
(1971):
From the standpoint of justice as fairness, a fundamental natural duty is the duty of
justice. This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist
and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established,
at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves. Thus if the basic
structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances,
everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme. (p. 115).
For our purposes, such a natural duty to support just institutions would have to be rooted in the
value of the state.2 A typical definition of a state is that it is a set of political institutions organized
to govern a particular territory that successfully lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence
within the territory. (Green, 1988; Klosko, 2005). The state does a number of things, including
protecting the physical safety of those within its territory from attacks from one another and from
people outside the territory, operating a system of dispute resolution spanning from police force
to administrative agencies to the judicial branch, solving coordination problems by establishing
and enforcing conventions, such as rules of the road, and so on. So, given that the state exists, and
given that it does these things, what sorts of moral implications follow? The answer is that it is
morally wrongful to interfere with institutions of the state that make it possible for individuals to
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live normal lives as we understand normalcy today. Wigmore’s admonition seems to apply just as
well here, as we could imagine him saying about paying taxes “[w]hoever is impelled to evade or
to resent it should retire from the society of organized and civilized communities, and become a
hermit” (1905, p. 2967). Paying one’s taxes then can be morally obligatory in that it is a way of fulfilling one’s natural duty to support just institutions. And the answer to the question whether one
has an obligation to pay taxes or not generally does not depend on whether the laws that determine
each taxpayer’s tax obligation get things right. A tax code can be flawed in any number of ways,
but that does not absolve individual taxpayers of their obligation to pay the prescribed amounts,
even if taxpayers may work towards reforming tax laws through legally sanctioned means.

3

DUTY TO COMPLY WITH REGULATORY OFFENSES

These two grounds for political obligation – principle of fairness and duty to support just institutions – are plausible and perhaps give rise to the duty to obey the law, but the question now is
whether such arguments can also ground a duty to cooperate with the state.
We have already looked at the example of the legal obligation to pay taxes. To further explore
the question of one’s duty to cooperate with the state, another place we might look at is regulatory
offenses. Regulatory offenses are sometimes called “public welfare offenses,” (Morrisette v. United
States, 1952; Brown, 2014) as opposed to ordinary offenses. Regulatory offenses refer to a type of
criminal offense that the government enacts as a way of enforcing its regulations of various aspects
of our lives – air quality, food safety, environmental preservation and so on. In the United States
law, typically, a statute would authorize a federal agency (or authorize the President to authorize
an agency) to promulgate regulations to implement the statute and specify that certain violations
of the statute or the regulations are crimes (e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5322; 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17; Lazarus, 1995,
p. 2441).
Take the prohibition on killing grizzly bears, which should be classified as a regulatory or public
welfare offense. Killing grizzly bears is a crime because the law criminally prohibits anyone from
“knowingly violat[ing] any provision” (16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1)) of Chapter 35 of Title 16 of the U.S.
Code, which includes a provision that makes it “unlawful” for anyone to “violate any regulation
pertaining . . . to any threatened species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to” the law that authorizes the Secretary of Interior to designate a species as an endangered or threatened species (16
U.S.C. § 1533), and the Department of Interior has designated grizzly bears as a threatened species
and has prohibited “tak[ing]” of “any grizzly bear” (50 C.F.R. § 17.40).
Now imagine a person who wants to kill a grizzly bear for sport and knows that he is not allowed
to do so under the law. Further consider that he lives in a remote area in Montana where it is
unlikely that he would be apprehended for killing a grizzly bear. Is it morally permissible for him
to kill a grizzly bear, assuming it is as a general matter morally permissible to hunt animals for
sport? In order for him to answer that question, he could ask why the government has decided
to protect certain species of animals from being hunted, whether it is a good thing that there is a
governmental institution that regulates this area, whether the rule it has promulgated is a good
rule, all things considered, and whether there are reasons to obey the rule even if the specific rule
is not a good rule. So the moral ins and outs of the issues may be complicated. However, it seems
plausible to deploy a combination of the fairness argument and the natural duty to support just
institutions argument to generate a moral obligation to refrain from killing grizzly bears. It seems
that a bad person would not have any compunction for killing a grizzly bear if it is unlikely that
he or she will be caught doing so, whereas a good person would refrain, and, at least to an extent,

216

LEE

this conclusion does not change even if the specific law, in his view, overprotects grizzly bears as
a species.
We may make similar arguments about broad swaths of regulatory offenses. Consider an
entirely different set of regulations: export controls. Under the Export Administration Act, the
Secretary of Commerce is authorized to promulgate a “control list” of certain items and “prohibit
unauthorized exports . . . of controlled items” (50 U.S.C. § 4813). The stated purpose of such a law
is “to restrict the export of items which would make a significant contribution to the military
potential of any other country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to the
national security of the United States” and “to restrict the export of items if necessary to further
significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations” (50 U.S.C. § 4811). The law declares that it is “unlawful for a person to violate” Subchapter I
of Chapter 58 of Title 50 of the U.S. Code or “of any regulation, order, license, or other authorization issued under the subchapter” and specifically provides that “[n]o person may engage in any
conduct prohibited by or contrary to, or refrain from engaging in any conduct required by this subchapter, the Export Administration Regulations,” or “any order, license or authorization issued
thereunder” (50 U.S.C. § 4819). The law criminalizes “willful” commission of such unlawful acts
(50 U.S.C. § 4819).
Now say a person is in a business that deals with certain equipment that has both civil and
military uses and is considering whether to export an item that is on the control list. For instance,
in a case called United States v. Lachman (2008), the item in question was a piece of equipment for
processing metal, the export of which was permitted so long as the equipment was under a certain
size but was prohibited otherwise. What is his obligation? The reasoning and conclusions would
be similar to what we saw in the Endangered Species Act context. He would have to ask why the
government has decided to restrict exports of certain items, whether it is a good thing that there is
a governmental institution that regulates this area, whether the rule it has promulgated is a good
rule, all things considered, and whether there are reasons to obey the rule even if the specific
rule is not a good rule. Again, the issues may be complicated, but it is not difficult to imagine an
argument in favor of a moral obligation not to export an item on the control list without a license,
even if the law, in his view, overregulates.
There are yet other mechanisms of regulation. Consider for instance the requirement that those
who give investment advice for compensation do so only after registering as an investment advisor (15 U.S.C. § 80b-3; 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2; 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17). Advising a person on how to invest
his or her funds and accepting a fee for the advice without registering with the government does
not seem harmful or wrongful, so long as no fraud is involved, the relevant parties understand
the relevant risks, and so on. So what would be wrong with practicing investment advising without registering in such a situation? The answer would be that, by having a license requirement
like that, we would be ensuring a healthy securities market, which in turn benefits every market
participant. We could tell similar stories about driving without a license or driving a car that has
skipped the last legally required inspection. These are all situations where the state imposes certain requirements on individuals in order to ensure a safe communal space for citizens to engage
in certain activities, and those who participate in the activities without complying with the measures put in place in order to ensure such safe spaces would be undermining the communal setup
and free-riding on the efforts of others that have made creations of such safe spaces possible.
These are different types of regulatory offenses, and it is plausible to believe that a good person
would obey such regulatory directives for the common good. Of course, things are more complicated than that. Laws may be misguided, overbroad, poorly written, or any combination of those.
It is implausible to posit an obligation to obey that attaches to all laws at all times in a just state,
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and a case-by-case evaluation is called for. At the same time, it is also implausible to suspend an
obligation to obey any time a law gets things wrong. Even just governments make mistakes and
correcting such mistakes can take time. A supportive citizen would not defy the law whenever the
citizen thinks the government has miscalculated.

4

DUTY NOT TO INTERFERE WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT

Regulatory offenses illustrate situations where we enforce the duty to support the state by criminalizing violations of regulations or laws that are generally classified as public welfare offenses.
Another place where we see how the law enforces the duty to support the state is when the law
has criminalized interference with law enforcement.
We can start with the general obstruction of justice provision, which makes it a crime for a
person to “corruptly . . . influence[], obstruct[], or impede[], or endeavor[] to influence, obstruct,
or impede, the due administration of justice” (18 U.S.C. § 1503). Some laws are more specific. Disobedience of law enforcement officers can be a crime. In New York, it is a crime to “congregate[]
with other persons in a public place and refuse[] to comply with a lawful order of the police to
disperse” with “intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating
a risk thereof” (N.Y. Penal Law § 240.20). In Alaska, a person commits the crime of “disorderly
conduct” if “in a public place, when a crime has occurred, the person refuses to comply with a
lawful order of a peace officer to disperse” (Alaska Stat. § 11.61.110). In Ohio, it is a crime to “[f]ail
to obey the lawful order of any law enforcement officer engaged in the law enforcement officer’s
duties at the scene of or in connection with a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any
kind” (Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.13(A)(3)).
Another obvious example where interference with law enforcement is criminalized is the crime
of contempt. It is a federal crime to “[d]isobe[y] or resist[] [a federal court’s] lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command” (18 U.S.C. § 401). In California, “[w]illful disobedience of the
terms as written of any process or court order or out-of-state court order, lawfully issued by any
court” is a misdemeanor (Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 166). It is a crime in Delaware to “knowingly
violate[] or fail[] to obey any provision of a protective order issued by the Family Court or a court
of any state, territory or Indian nation in the United States” (Del. Code Ann. 11, § 1271A). Closely
related is the crime commonly known as “bail-jumping,” and the federal version criminalizes
“knowingly fail[ing] to appear before a court as required by the conditions of release” (18 U.S.C.
§ 3146).
These provisions criminalize interference with the legal system in certain situations. One might
defend laws like this on the following grounds: the legal system needs to employ coercive devices
like criminal law and punishment to ensure compliance with the law, because otherwise the rule
of law could not become reality. Of course, the fact that the legal system needs the ability to punish people in order to administer justice is insufficient to show that those who interfere with law
enforcement commit moral wrongs. At the same time, the observation that the legal system crucially depends on the cooperation of those who are subject to it in order to function as a legal
system can serve as the basis for a moral obligation on the part of the citizens. That is, persons
have a moral duty not to interfere with workings of a legitimate and reasonably just legal system,
and it is morally wrong for people to violate such duties by disobeying authoritative directives in
these specified conditions.
There are also laws that prohibit certain activities not because those activities are necessarily wrong but because criminalizing certain activities helps the state combat other activities. For
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example, it is a federal crime to engage in “a monetary transaction in criminally derived property
of a value greater than $10,000 [where the property] is derived from specified unlawful activity”
(18 U.S.C. § 1957). The term “specified unlawful activity” covers a variety of offenses such as drug
offenses, bribery, and human trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)). People who engage in these sorts
of transactions tend not to be sympathetic figures. For instance, a person who uses his public office
for personal gain by demanding payments from those eager to curry favor and funneling money
into his personal accounts is corrupt and is in violation of his fiduciary obligations. Therefore, it
may be another easy case for the good person, since a good person would not be engaging in these
sorts of shenanigans in the first place, whereas a bad person would of course not hesitate from
laundering dirty money to cover their tracks after profiting from illicit activities.
At the same time, we need to dig deeper to see exactly what the wrong of money laundering
is. Douglas Husak (2005), for instance, has expressed some skepticism about the law by arguing
that, granting that a person commits a “first” wrong by, say, accepting bribes, “it is hard to see why
persons who deposit or withdraw [criminally derived] funds from banks commit a second wrong”
(p. 67). So, what exactly is money laundering? Money laundering, as conduct, accomplishes two
things. First, the possibility of money laundering makes the prospect of committing crimes more
attractive to potential perpetrators, and, in that sense, it encourages criminal activities (Alldridge,
2016). Second, money laundering, by giving criminals a way to conceal proceeds from criminal
activities, makes it easier for them to avoid detection by law enforcement authorities. The first
wrong, then, belongs to the family of wrongs having to do with complicity; the second wrong is a
form of obstruction of justice.
Money laundering, then, need not be thought of as implicating an exotic wrong at all. It is
analogous to the common law crime of receiving or concealing stolen property (LaFave, 2019, p.
3). The closest offense in the influential Model Penal Code is “aiding consummation of crime,”
which is defined as “purposely aid[ing] another to accomplish an unlawful object of a crime,
as by safeguarding the proceeds thereof or converting the proceeds into negotiable funds” (Model
Penal Code § 242.4). Money laundering is also analogous to various obstruction of justice offenses.
The Model Penal Code also lists as an offense “hindering apprehension or prosecution,” which
provides in part that “[a] person commits an offense if, with purpose to hinder the apprehension,
prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for crime, he . . . conceals or destroys evidence
of the crime . . . .” (Model Penal Code § 242.3(3)).
Thus far, then, it appears that one can start from a plausible case for a duty obey the law, from
which one can derive a duty to obey various regulatory offenses and a duty to not to interfere
with law enforcement. And from the existence of such duties, we can see the moral basis for
criminalizing violations of the same duties.

5
DUTY TO ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT BY PROVIDING
INFORMATION
Various criminal provisions discussed so far may be justified as grounded in a general duty
to cooperate with the government and law enforcement. And if we look generally at what the
government does, gathering of information is ever present. We may roughly classify information
gathering as taking place in different domains of government activity: surveillance, investigation,
and adjudication. And there are many laws that impose obligations to provide information
to the government in these various domains, and such laws may be grounded on a duty to
cooperate with the government through providing information and enhancing the government’s
knowledge about criminal wrongdoing.
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We are now approaching areas where Wigmore’s “fundamental maxim that the public . . . has
a right to every man’s evidence” may apply, as an obvious example of information-giving or
knowledge-enhancing is the duty to testify, which can ground various criminal provisions to assist
the government. For instance, once a court issues a subpoena to order a witness to testify, disobeying it can lead to being held in contempt. Another familiar law having to do with giving information during adjudication is perjury, which is defined in federal law as a situation where a person
“willfully and contrary to . . . oath states . . . any material matter which he does not believe to be
true” (18 U.S.C. § 1621).
Of course, since perjury law controls situations whenever one testifies under oath or makes a
sworn declaration, the law covers both adjudication and investigation. But one need not be testifying or declaring under penalty of perjury to be prosecuted for lying to the government. It is a
federal crime, for instance, “in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch of the Government,” for a person to “knowingly and willfully . . . make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” (18 U.S.C. § 1001). This crime, the
crime of false statements, criminalizes lying to a federal government official conducting an investigation (Griffin, 2009).
The law also requires people to assist with government’s gathering of information in some
contexts. For instance, the requirement that one declare the amount of currency one is carrying
abroad over a certain minimum is a way of having information about potentially suspect conduct,
like running an illicit business, flow to the government (31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)). There are also many
laws that require reports of signs of suspicious activities by other people, as we see in various
anti-money laundering laws that bind financial institutions (Kang, 2017; Lynch, 1986; Thompson,
2009).
Are all these crimes the kinds of crimes a good person would not commit in the same way a
good person pays taxes and complies with various regulations that are designed for the common
good? More specifically, is there a duty to cooperate and enhance the government’s knowledge of
criminal wrongdoing by providing information about criminal activities to the government? In
answering this question, as I’ve been noting throughout, it is important to keep in mind that this
Essay asks whether there is a duty to cooperate with law enforcement in a reasonably just state.
Assuming a reasonably just state, then, is there a duty to cooperate with law enforcement by not
violating the kinds of laws just mentioned? It does not seem patently unreasonable to think so,
which is why T’Challa’s answer on Black Jeopardy has some initial plausibility. However, at this
point, a sense of unease might creep in (if it has not already). What explains it?
Let’s return to the crime of money laundering and see what cooperation with law enforcement
would look like. We noted above that money laundering is analogous to the common law crime
of receiving or concealing stolen property and the crime of hindering prosecution. But what if the
person who has committed the first crime and the person who is committing the second crime
of money laundering is one and the same? In that case, it would be awkward to say that a good
person who has committed a crime would not engage in money laundering, since a good person
would not have ended up profiting from illegal activities in the first place. But we could still say
that a person who commits the first wrong can change from a bad person to a good person and
refrain from the committing the second wrong, perhaps as the pang of conscience kicks in.
That much seems fair enough, but once we push this thought in the same direction a little further, we end up in an odd place. Say a person stabs a person to death and throws him in his car
trunk where he bleeds to death. The killer buries the body in the woods that night, and the next
morning he cleans the blood from his car. Or a person scores a big heist and then “lies low” and
avoids major purchases in order to avoid detection would be committing new offenses. Would
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both of them be committing a second wrong of interfering with law enforcement? Say a person
simply goes about one’s ordinary and normal routine on a day to day basis after committing a
crime. If “hindering apprehension or prosecution” were a genuine moral wrong that can be criminalized, then a person who commits a crime and does not immediately turn himself in may be
in continuing violation of the obligation from the moment the crime was committed. This means
all of these people may be engaging in the wrong of “hindering prosecution.” Should we say that
is what a good person would do? Would a good person, in other words, turn himself or herself in?
A federal criminal provision that comes close to saying that is the crime of “flight to avoid
prosecution,” which makes it a crime for a person to “move[] or travel[] in interstate or foreign
commerce with intent . . . to avoid prosecution” (18 U.S.C. § 1073). The language of the statute
does not specify the meaning of “prosecution,” and it could be construed quite broadly to cover
situations where one simply goes from one state to another after committing a crime with intent
to avoid being apprehended and prosecuted. Indeed, there are some languages in the caselaw that
suggest as much. In United States v. Bando (1957), for instance, defendants were charged with a
conspiracy to injure a witness in a pending investigation in New York and to remove one of the coconspirators from the state in order to prevent his prosecution. The said co-conspirator was driven
to Youngstown, Ohio from New York, and “[i]t does not appear that at the time [he] was driven to
Youngstown, the police knew who had committed the crime,” and “[n]o formal charge had been
filed against anyone for the attack” on the witness (p. 837). Rejecting the defendants’ challenge
that there was no conspiracy to violate the flight to avoid prosecution law because no one had
been “formally charged,” the court said that “[t]he words ‘to avoid prosecution’ mean ‘to avoid
being prosecuted’” and that “[t]he statute does not say ‘to avoid a pending prosecution’” (p. 843).
Another case of a person who was punished for failing to turn himself in is the case of Jeffrey
Gafoor from the U.K. (Sekar, 2017).3 Jeffrey Gafoor was convicted in 2003 for killing Lynette White
in 1988. This was not an ordinary murder case because three men known as the “Cardiff Three”
were initially convicted of the same killing in 1992, but the convictions were thrown out in the
same year because of the coercive nature of police interrogations. The case reopened in 2000, and
DNA evidence linked the killing to Gafoor. For our purposes, the interesting part of the case is
what the judge sentencing him noted as “the most serious aggravating factor in this case namely
allowing innocent men to be convicted of the murder” (Sekar, 2017,p. 137). He added that it was a
“very serious aggravating factor . . . that Gafoor was content to allow innocent men to be arrested,
to stand their trial and be convicted of a murder he knew had committed” (Sekar, 2017, p. 129). The
idea seems to be that turning oneself in to prevent a wrongful conviction is not only something a
good person would do but that failing to do so is criminally wrongful and a basis for increasing
one’s punishment (Sekar, 2017, pp. 130).
Arguments like this make some sense if we posit a general obligation to support the state and
adopt the view that it is morally desirable for people to make the state’s job of apprehending criminal wrongdoers easier. However, as illustrated, this line of thinking seems to travel very far, perhaps too far.

6

DUTY TO COOPERATE AND THE RIGHT TO RESIST

What is troubling about the argument developed thus far about the duty to cooperate is that it
seems to be the case that emphasizing what citizens owe the state and adopting the view that a
good person cooperates with law enforcement bring us to a place where there is something morally
problematic about asserting one’s rights in those cases where rights-assertions interfere with law
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enforcement. Many rights that people may assert against the government can be characterized
as vehicles of obstruction of justice. Refusing to consent to a warrantless search, insisting on the
presumption of innocence and making the government prove one’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, exercising one’s right to a trial, exercising one’s right to a jury trial, invoking the prohibition of double jeopardy, asserting the privilege against self-incrimination, refusing to answer
questions without a lawyer present, and demanding not only assistance of counsel throughout
but also effective assistance of counsel, are all exercises of rights guaranteed in the Constitution
that can amount to an obstruction of the state’s attempt to enforce the law.
We need to proceed carefully here, however, as assertions of these rights do different things.
Consider Powell v. Alabama, a 1932 Supreme Court case arising from one of the most notorious
American legal disasters known as the Scottsboro Boys case, where, despite substantial evidence
indicating their innocence, nine young black males, ages ranging from thirteen to twenty, were
convicted of the crime of raping two white women, after not having been given a fair, deliberate trial, not having been received adequate legal representation, and having been tried by an
all-white jury. The Powell Court, after listing various procedural failures in the case, held that the
defendants’ convictions were unconstitutional because they were denied adequate legal representation. Rulings in cases like these show that what may appear to be “resistance” of law enforcement in fact aids law enforcement by preventing false convictions.
This feature of rights is not limited to unjust prosecutions. Even assuming a reasonably just
state and law enforcement officers working in good faith, the government actors may be misguided in any number of ways: they can make mistakes, may be working with limited information that leads them astray, may have on institutional blinders that prevent them from seeing the
full picture clearly, or may be pursuing prosecutions on the basis of a legal interpretation that
is wrong or may be proven to be ultimately incorrect or unwise. Given these possibilities, some
of the assertions of rights are not correctly characterized as “obstruction of justice.” Though the
empirics are obviously controversial, the right to effective assistance of counsel, presumption of
innocence, and the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement can keep the government disciplined about its selection of cases to prosecute (Laudan, 2006, p. 218). The right to trial by jury
is often defended as a form of epistemic democracy that has a better chance of arriving at correct
answers than an adjudication system run by professionals and experts (Lee, 2018, pp. 1285–1287;
Schwartzberg, 2018, pp. 447–448; Landemore, 2012).
But not all rights are like that, as some do get in the way of the truth. The right to refuse to a
search and the right against self-incrimination are both ways of denying the government access
to potentially probative evidence. So, in these cases at least, would it be wrong for a person living
in a good society like the one in T’Challa’s mindset to assert these rights? It is, after all, one of the
cliches about rights that just because one has a right does not mean that one is right to exercise
it. Maybe some criminal procedural rights are like that when dealing with the state’s effort to
enforce the law. Or, at most, one might argue, these rights exist to protect the innocent, not the
guilty. That is, a person who knows he is factually innocent would be right in exercising these
rights to protect himself from misguided searches or interrogations, but a guilty person would be
simply obstructing justice, one might argue. In fact, even those who believe that they know which
facts the government is interested in pursuing but disagree with the government about whether
the facts will turn up anything incriminating may have a duty to cooperate to help clear up the
confusion efficiently and quickly.
Is this right? There are at least two theoretical paths open here. The first path has been articulated by Sandra Marshall and R.A. Duff (2016), who have argued in favor of “a civic responsibility” for a person who has committed a crime to “admit her crimes and to submit herself to the
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judgment of her peers through the criminal process”4 (p. 43). Duff (2018) has also written that
a defendant has a “civic duty” to play “an active, and honest, role in the process,” which “must
encompass admitting, confessing, one’s guilt if one knows it – which is to plead ‘Guilty’” (p. 134).
Not only that, Duff says a responsible citizen should also “be ready to give evidence and undergo
cross-examination at her trial” (p. 134).
The first objection to this line of thinking would come out of the civil disobedience literature
about resisting injustice (Delmas, 2018; Capers, 2018). Another possibility is to argue, as Tommie
Shelby (2016) does, that those who are victims of systemic injustice at times lack the obligation to
obey the law. He writes, “Even if the United States is reasonably just . . . , the heavy burdens that
the black urban poor are forced to carry, and the length of time they have had to carry them, may
justify their refusal to comply with public demands until their load is significantly lightened” (p.
219). But these arguments rely on presence of injustice to suspend the duty to obey or cooperate,
which leaves open the possibility of Marshall and Duff’s position being correct in a just society. Is
there another way to push back against Marshall and Duff?
One may do so by taking the second theoretical path, the one taken by Alice Ristroph (2009).
Ristroph has suggested in her Hobbes-inspired account that criminal procedure rights may be
more specific instantiations of a general, more fundamental right to resist stemming from the
right of self-preservation that both the innocent and the guilty retain. Ristroph says that under a
Hobbesian account, “punishment is so great an intrusion on human freedom, dignity, and selfpreservation that the only way to respect the humanity of those we punish is to acknowledge
their right to resist” and to “refuse[] to blame humans for acting on the fundamental and rational
drive for self-preservation” (p. 628). This need not mean anything goes as long as one is seeking
to resist punishment since some ways of resisting punishment are more harmful than others. But
what we can do, according to Ristroph, is to rationalize “constitutional and statutory rights of the
accused and the already-convicted as forms of legitimate, nonviolent resistance to punishment”
(p. 629) and as “weaker relatives of the right to resist punishment” (p. 623). Because Ristroph’s
suggestion does not depend on the right to resist injustice but rather depends on a person’s right
of self-preservation, this right to resist account would provide an account that applies to everyone
who is facing prosecution, even in a just society. This account would thus avoid the conclusion of
Duff and Marshall’s duty to cooperate account without having to invoke the presence of injustice
in individual cases or in the system or unjust targeting of a segment of the population.
However, Ristroph’s approach has the opposite problem. It certainly is theoretically convenient
to have the right to resist manifest itself as a variety of rights that defendants already have, say,
under the Constitution. However, there is no reason to expect the scope of the so-called right to
resist to stay within the confines of various procedural guarantees, as the right to resist stemming
from the right of self-preservation seems quite blunt as a concept. For instance, if there were such
a right, it seems that various crimes against law enforcement should not exist as prohibitions. As
noted above, obstruction of justice is a crime. Disobedience of law enforcement officers can be a
crime. It is also a crime to disobey commands of courts, for instance, to reappear to face one’s own
prosecution. It is also not clear how one’s “right to resist” can sit next to the prohibition on perjury.
Wouldn’t one’s right to resist include a right to perjure oneself in a courtroom in order to avoid
being convicted and punished? It is true that the privilege against self-incrimination means one
need not testify against oneself in a case in which one is a criminal defendant and the privilege can
be explained as a manifestation of the right to resist, but one is still not allowed to perjure oneself
in order to avoid prosecution. Perhaps many of these crimes are overbroad and perhaps should
be appropriately limited by invoking the right to resist, but it is still not clear how impositions of
such duties, as a general matter, can co-exist with the right to resist.5
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The list of crimes that seems to conflict with the right to resist does not end there. The federal
crime of false statements, which criminalizes lying to federal agents, does not make an exception
for those who lie in order to avoid being prosecuted (Brogan v. United States, 1988). Neither is one
allowed to launder money or to fail to declare the amount of currency one is carrying in order to
hide one’s own criminal wrongdoing. Also, as noted above, the federal crime of “flight to avoid
prosecution” has been enforced against people who leave a state after committing a crime in order
to avoid being prosecuted even if the law enforcement had not even been aware of the crime at
the time of the flight, so it cuts more broadly than a typical “bail-jumping” provision. This crime,
too, is difficult to square with the notion of one’s right to resist that stems from the right of selfpreservation.
Again, perhaps these are precisely the kinds of examples that demonstrate the need for a concept like the right to resist, as some of these crimes do seem to cut too broadly (Griffin, 2009;
Green, 2001). However, the problem with the idea of a “right to resist” is its seemingly peremptory nature, and Ristroph’s (2009) explanation does not help us understand how such a right is to
be limited.6 That is, the concept of the right to resist does not offer a way of taking into account the
idea of a duty to cooperate with the government. True, it may be the case that recognizing the right
to resist in some fashion would give us a reason to question the existence of a duty to cooperate
and a reason to limit the scope of all these laws, but, just as Marshall and Duff’s duty to cooperate
account seems to travel too far in the direction of submitting to the authorities, Ristroph’s right to
resist account seems to travel too far in the opposite direction. It seems to me that there is another,
better way.

7

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DUTIES OF CITIZENSHIP

Consider again the examples of “hindering prosecution” by committing crimes and engaging in
apprehension-avoidance acts, some relatively passive like not making flashy purchases from a big
heist, some more active like moving to a different state to avoid apprehension after committing
a crime, and some even more active like engaging in money laundering by investing criminally
derived funds in various ways. How should we think about such acts?
It seems to me that instead of thinking of these as moral failures characteristic of bad citizens or
as justified exercises of the right to resist, we should see some of them, though not all, as free movements of individuals within a realm that the legal system ought to protect from state intrusion.
While individuals do not have a right to engage in detection avoidance activities after committing
crimes, their failure to turn themselves in or otherwise make prosecutions easier should not be
considered a wrong but rather should be considered their privilege as free persons. And in order
to preserve a sphere of autonomous living for individuals, there ought to be an understanding
as to what sorts of detection avoidance activities are within “the rules of the game” that set the
parameters of acceptable behavior for all the participants.
What would such “rules of the game” look like? We can start with the proposition that citizens
have a duty to cooperate with the government in a reasonably just society as a general matter. It
would be difficult to give a moral justification for various regulatory offenses, laws that prohibit
interference with law enforcement, and laws that require cooperation with law enforcement in
various ways without positing such a duty. At the same time, duties of citizenship should not
automatically include rendering assistance to law enforcement. Situations where such lack of
cooperation or even resistance should be allowed are not limited to situations characterized by
injustice or to situations involving laws that are misguided for any number of reasons (Gardner,
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2020; Yankah, 2019). There are times when the demands that the law makes of its citizens in the
way it does are appropriate in that they are requests for the citizens to cooperate and serve the
common good, yet a person should still be allowed to refuse to accede to such demands, because
having laws that require otherwise would be unduly intrusive. In other words, the state has the
power to set down all kinds of rules to make the project of living together possible, but we should
recognize, when formulating the rules, the ways in which giving the state such powers can easily
lead to oppression, and such oppression can take the form of the state requiring cooperation with
law enforcement and criminalizing efforts to place limitations on the state’s exercises of powers.
While such situations where not cooperating should be allowed can at times be characterized
as individuals having certain rights, such as a right to privacy or a right to resist, the idea of rights
does not always supply the most perspicacious framework. If we formulate these situations as
rights, we would have to defend them as individual rights to interfere with justice, where the state
represents justice, and the state enters the ring on the high ground from the get-go. And a likely
consequence of looking at the issues in this way is to place strict limitations on such rights given
the defensive posture one would have to assume when facing those, in T’Challa’s words, who
are “only here to protect us.” Neither is it helpful to respond to T’Challa by simply repeating the
slogan that “All Cops Are Bastards,” the force of which would turn on actually demonstrating the
truth of the slogan. Rather, such cases ought to be considered with an eye towards specifying the
proper terms of interaction between citizens and the state even in a just state and with the goal of
preserving a sphere of autonomy in which citizens can move freely and pursue their ordinary life
projects free of the state’s coercive interference.
As to what it all means in concrete terms, it is difficult to say, as case-by-case assessments need
to be made. Perhaps the state is well-intentioned and even competent enough to know which
policies to pursue to do its job of protecting the people’s physical security and promoting general
welfare. It may sometimes and appropriately carry out its functions with the help of criminal law.
When these laws appear to overreach, our focus should not just be on whether the government is
on the right track as it tackles social problems or on whether individual rights are at stake but also
on the costs that are imposed on citizens when legal requirements are introduced, even if such
requirements come simply from the seemingly reasonable position that people should assist or at
least not interfere with the government’s core functions. And in order to understand what sorts
of costs are too burdensome, we need to have a baseline understanding of the realm of autonomy
that needs to be protected, which can be used as a basis for thinking through the question of what
sorts of duties of citizenship exist, can be legally prescribed, and can be criminally enforced.

8

CONCLUSION

This Essay has argued that the natural duty to support just institutions and to do one’s fair share
as a member of a polity can give rise to a duty to obey the law and cooperate with the state. Such
considerations mean that it is wrong to commit regulatory offenses and that it is wrong to interfere
with and undermine workings of the legal system by obstructing justice in various ways. I have
also argued that taking this thought further could lead to a situation where there may be a duty
for those who have committed offenses to cooperate with law enforcement and for the guilty to
turn themselves in and not assert various constitutional rights that stand in the way of the state’s
attempts to enforce the law through apprehension, prosecution, and punishment. One way out of
this spot is to introduce the idea of the right to resist, but it has a number of drawbacks. Instead, we
should think of duties of citizenship as being consistent with failures to cooperate with the state
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when such failures take place within the realm of freedom that a good society ought to protect and
maintain. This, it seems to me, is what is wrong with King T’Challa’s answer on Black Jeopardy!,
Wigmore’s articulation of the public’s right to evidence, and Justice Scalia’s picture of a virtuous
citizen. A virtuous citizen may obstruct the state, even a just one.7
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Thanks to Sarah Seo for prompting me to sharpen this point about the distinction between one’s own and others’
wrongdoing.
The focus of this Essay is on the duty one owes to the state, but there is a question here as to whether the duty
to obey the law or the duty to cooperate is owed to the state or to one’s fellow citizens. The two duties are closely
related, as one’s duties to the state may derive from one’s duties to one’s fellow citizens and vice versa. This Essay
is framed in terms of the duty one owes to the state, but the important question as to when the two duties may
come apart is not something that this Essay will address. Thanks to Jennifer Lackey for raising this question.
Thanks to Hannah Quirk for bringing this case to my attention.
To be clear, Duff and Marshall’s views are nuanced in ways that we cannot get into here, and they are certainly
not in favor of a “legal duty” to assist the state that could lead to punishment for failure to turn oneself in (p. 42).
Ristroph (2015) acknowledges all this when she says “American law does not endorse violence against police
officers, prosecutors, judges, or corrections officials,” and “in various ways the law does impose duties to submit
to specific exercises of state force,” as “it is a crime to resist arrest, or flee from prosecution (‘jump bail’), or escape
from custody” (p. 1596). However, the issue of reconciling these laws with a right to resist remains.
In fact, Ristroph (2009) says that the Hobbesian right to resist is not even meant to be understood as a “legally
enforceable claim” as the right has “no correlative duties” (pp. 617-618). If that is so, then the implications of the
right to resist account for rights of criminal defendants are obscure.
Thanks to Morgan Cloud, Margareth Etienne, Todd Haugh, Stephen Henderson, Heidi Hurd, Jennifer Lackey,
Sarah Seo, Christopher Slobogin, and Aness Webster for very helpful comments. Thanks also to Chrystel Yoo for
research assistance.
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